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ABSTRACT 
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BY 
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Committee Chair: Mark Keil 
 
Major Academic Unit: Robinson College of Business 
 
 
Escalation of commitment is the voluntary continuation of investing resources into what appears to be a failing 
course of action whose outcome is uncertain. Investigation into the escalation of commitment phenomenon is 
important to organizations because such behavior could result in grave economic loss. This research investigates two 
cognitive biases that we posit lead to IT escalation of commitment, namely, attribution bias and overconfidence in 
an escalation decision, as well as desire to rectify past outcomes (DRPO) for its potential role as a mediator. To test 
our research model, 160 IT managers participated in a web-based role-playing experiment. Attribution was 
manipulated at two levels (internal and external), creating two treatment conditions. We posited that the participants 
assigned to the internal attribution condition would escalate their commitment to the failing IT project to a greater 
extent than participants assigned to the external attribution condition; that individuals that have a high, versus low, 
level of overconfidence would have a greater tendency to escalate; and that DRPO would mediate the effects of 
attribution and overconfidence on escalation of commitment. Attribution bias was significant at the .1 level, but in 
the opposite direction of what was hypothesized; overconfidence showed a significant main effect on escalation.  
The effect of attribution bias on escalation was significantly mediated by DRPO, but the effect of overconfidence on 
escalation was not mediated by DRPO.  Implications of these findings for both research and practice are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background 
There are many real-life instances in which individuals can be locked into a failing course 
of action even in the face of opposing evidence suggesting that continuing on the same course 
will likely lead to failure (Staw, 1976).  In the literature, such behavior is commonly referred to 
as escalation behavior or escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976), entrapment (Brockner, Rubin, 
& Lang, 1981; Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Rubin & Brockner, 1975), and throwing good money 
after bad (Staw, 1981).  The consequence of such behavior could ultimately result in grave 
economic loss that can jeopardize, not only an organization’s competitive standing, but also lead 
to its demise.  Formally, Keil, Mann, and Rai (2000) propose a working definition for escalation 
of commitment: 
Escalation can be said to occur within an organization when there is a presence of 
negative project status information that fails to be processed appropriately, 
resulting in continuation of what appears to be a failing course of action (p. 634).  
This definition reflects three defining characteristics of escalation of commitment, “where losses 
have been suffered, where there is an opportunity to persist or withdraw, and where the 
consequences of these actions are uncertain” (Staw, 1997, p. 192).  In addition, central to an 
escalation situation is the negative feedback the decision-maker is made aware of, concerning the 
unlikelihood of the project’s success, prior to a decision being made.   
What makes the escalation of commitment phenomenon an interesting topic of study is 
that “such behavior appears contrary to human logic” (Staw, 1976, p. 27).  For instance, one 
would typically expect that individuals would reverse decisions or change behaviors that produce 
negative outcomes; however, within the context of investment decisions, “negative consequences 
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may actually cause decision makers to increase the commitment of resources and undergo the 
risk of further negative consequences” (Staw, 1976, p. 27). 
 
1.2 Problem Statement and Motivation for Study 
Escalation of commitment has been widely examined within management, psychology, 
and information technology (IT) literature, and continues to be an active area of study.  In 
software projects alone, the problem of escalation seems widespread, as confirmed by industry 
reports and scholars alike.  For example, The Standish Group’s 2003 report cited that 43 percent 
of software projects were over budget and 54 percent had time overruns.  Earlier reports 
(Standish Group, 1994) cite that a 31.1 percent of software projects were canceled prior to 
completion.  Other studies have confirmed even greater percentages of software projects coming 
in at a loss.  For example, some IT projects have had cost overruns of up to 200 percent (Keil & 
Robey, 1999).   
There are several theoretical perspectives regarding the reasons why escalation of 
commitment occurs (Keil et al., 2000), such as Self Justification Theory (Staw, 1976); Approach 
Avoidance Theory (Brockner, Shaw, & Rubin, 1979; Rubin & Brockner, 1975); Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980; Whyte, 1986); and Agency Theory (Harrison & 
Harrell, 1993).  Though criticized by many scholars as an explanation for escalation, Self 
Justification Theory is the most dominant theoretical perspective (Brockner, 1992) and remains a 
strong contender as the best explanation for escalation (Brockner, 1992; Keil, 1995).   
However, as with most complex phenomena, a single theoretical perspective seldom 
provides a complete account of why a given phenomenon occurs, and in many cases a single 
theoretical perspective has generated mixed results.  For example, in Whyte’s (1986) review of 
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the escalation of commitment literature, he indicates that a later study conducted by Staw and 
Ross (1978) failed to reproduce Staw’s (1976) finding that personal responsibility for negative 
consequences tends to lead to escalation of commitment.  Keil et al. (2000) provide similar 
examples of failures to replicate Staw’s (1976) findings (e.g., Armstrong et al. 1993; Singer & 
Singer, 1985).  While these studies were not necessarily pure replications of Staw (1976), their 
findings serve as a reminder that the escalation of commitment phenomenon is “very complex” 
and thus calls for “more sophisticated models to help explain escalation behavior” (Keil et. al., 
2000, p. 656).  Consequently, it has been suggested that a better understanding of escalation 
might be obtained through the application of multiple theoretical approaches (Brockner, 1992).   
Within the new product development literature, we are further reminded that though 
several studies have enhanced our understanding of the escalation of commitment phenomenon, 
“the mechanism of escalation of commitment remains relatively unknown and under researched” 
(Schmidt & Calantone, 2002, p. 105).  Having a better understanding of what factors contribute 
to escalation of commitment to a failing course of action is of great importance to academics and 
practitioners alike.  For academics, having a better understanding of the escalation of 
commitment phenomenon can help the advancement of theory building and model development.  
For practitioners, a better understanding can help organizations successfully develop and 
implement processes to help mitigate such costly behavior and free up resources for uses that 
work and lead to better performance.  As succinctly put by Staw and Ross (1978, p. 41), 
Questions such as whether to increase or decrease funding for corporate research 
and development in the face of negligible output, or whether to alter expenditures 
for advertising in the face of slumping sales, all address the same basic issue: 
whether to commit additional resources to a previously chosen course of action.  
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It is thus very important to understand what determines commitment, and to be 
able to identify any effects that may bias or systematically affect resource 
allocation decisions. 
 
1.3 Research Perspective and Focus 
Extant literature related to escalation situations cites four types of determinants of 
escalation behavior (Staw & Ross, 1987): (1) project determinants, such as the substantial costs 
that may arise for terminating a project prematurely (Northcraft & Wolf, 1984); (2) social 
determinants, such as not wanting to expose personal error to others (Fox & Staw, 1979); (3) 
organizational determinants, such as institutional inertia wherein there can be a very loose 
connection between organizational goals and action (March & Olson, 1976) or failures in 
internal communication that can make organizations slow to respond even when the need for 
change is recognized (Staw & Ross, 1989); and (4) psychological determinants, which represent 
the cognitive biases that may underlie decision-making in escalation situations.  The current 
research focuses on the latter, psychological determinants of escalation of commitment. 
  “Psychological factors are those that cause managers to become convinced that things 
do not look so bad after all…”  (Keil & Mann, 1997, p. 140).  Examples of psychological factors 
include the sunk-cost effect (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Garland, 1990), having a prior history of 
success on similar projects (Keil, 1995), and a high level of personal responsibility for having 
initiated the course of action (Staw, 1976).   
A research path receiving increasing attention is the investigation of individual cognitive 
biases in processing negative feedback (e.g., Depledge, 2003; Keil, Depledge, and Rai, 2007).  
When decision makers are presented with negative feedback about a previously chosen course of 
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action and must decide (Keil et al., 2007) either to continue with the previously chosen course of 
action or withdraw (Brockner, 1992), biased interpretations of the causes for the negative 
feedback may blind decision makers from recognizing the error in their previous choices and 
decisions.  The contention is that cognitive biases prevent individuals from fully processing 
negative feedback, leading to escalation behavior.   
Prior research (Keil, et al., 2007) has identified selective perception and illusion of 
control as two cognitive biases that promote escalation behavior in IT projects.  However, 
minimal empirical efforts have been devoted to the examination of other cognitive biases that 
can potentially play a similar role in IT project escalation (Depledge, 2003; Keil et al., 2007).  
While a wide variety of cognitive biases have been identified (e.g., Sage, 1981; Hogarth, 1987) 
(Kirs, Pflughoeft, & Kroeck, 2001), such biases remain relatively unexplored in the escalation of 
commitment literature (Keil et al., 2007).    
To address this theoretical gap, this study examines the effect of two types of cognitive 
biases on escalation of commitment: attribution bias (the internal and external factors to which a 
setback is attributed) and overconfidence.  These biases are said to originate from the decision-
maker’s past experiences, intrinsic beliefs, and the task environment (Kirs et al., 2001), and have 
not been previously explored within the context of IT project escalation.   
Discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section, attribution refers to causal 
information ascribed to a given setback or success.  Attribution bias1 refers to an individual’s 
tendency to attribute their successes to their own efforts, abilities or other dispositions, and to 
attribute their failures to bad luck, inherent difficulty of the task, and or various environmental 
                                                
1Some scholars also refer to attribution bias as the self-serving bias. 
	  
	  
2 Overconfidence has been divided into three subareas by Moore & Healy (2008), namely, (i) overestimation 
(judgments of one’s absolute performance or ability); (ii) miscalibration or overprecision (confidence in the 
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factors (Bradley, 1978; Miller & Ross, 1975).  Thus, internal or endogenous attributions surface 
following positive feedback whereas external or exogenous attributions surface following 
negative feedback.  However, as discussed in more detail in a subsequent section, evidence has 
also been found for a reversal of attribution bias, such as when, counterdefensive attributions are 
made (Bradley, 1978); which may result in counterdefensive bias.  Formally, counterdefensive 
bias relates to attributing negative consequences internally (Lawson & McKinnon, 1999).  
Staw and Ross (1978) provide initial evidence for the notion that individuals process 
information differently after a setback has been encountered and it is attributed to either internal 
or external factors.  Thus, it is posited that the disparity in processing information may account 
for differences in decision-making (Staw & Ross, 1978).  However, even though Staw and Ross 
find support for the notion that external attribution promotes escalation of commitment in 
resource allocation decisions (as predicted by Brehm’s (1966) reactance theory), the researchers 
suggest that one possible focus for future research should include an examination of variables 
which might reinforce or heighten a self-justification effect, such as visible responsibility for 
negative consequences wherein adverse events are attributed directly to the individual or where 
the decision-maker has publicly announced or lobbied for the losing course of action; an 
empirical gap this research addresses.  For instance, in our proposed experimental design, 
participants will read a scenario describing a troubled IT project.  The scenario is designed to 
manipulate whether the cause of the setback is attributed to internal or external factors.  Visible 
responsibility for the setback, in our case, becomes evident when participants in the internal 
attribution treatment condition, are explicitly informed that they attribute the causes for the 
setback to their own lack of skill in managing the project team and insufficient effort spent on 
the project.  Our scenario also informs participants that the organization has publicly announced 
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the previous course of action; i.e., that the product will be launched in two weeks.  Thus, our 
scenario is designed in a way that captures variables that might reinforce or heighten a self-
justification effect. 
Overconfidence refers to “the systematic overestimation of the accuracy of one’s 
decisions and to the overestimation of the precision of one’s knowledge” (Dittrich, Güth, & 
Maciejovsky, 2001, p. 2).  In short, overconfidence is the tendency to be unjustifiably certain of 
one’s ability to predict accurately (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992).  As evidenced by the literature 
and in practice, overconfidence is a bias common among business decision-makers.  For 
instance, it is posited that overconfident decision-makers are more prone to take bets rather than 
seek information that will enhance their understanding of a given object, situation, or event.  By 
ignoring negative information, overconfident decision-makers are prone to commit to their prior 
course of action (Klayman, Soll, Gonzalez-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999).   
Though there are varying opinions on whether overconfidence is induced by situational 
factors or whether it is a stable individual trait (Griffin & Varey, 1996), the present study 
characterizes overconfidence as an individual trait that can be measured independently from 
situational factors (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992).   
Attribution bias and overconfidence are thought to lead to escalation of commitment 
(respectively) when (a) the decision-maker attributes the project’s setback to his/her own failings 
(e.g., lack of ability and or allocating insufficient effort in managing the project) and thus 
triggers a self-justification mechanism; and (b) when the decision-maker overestimates accuracy 
and knowledge.  We argue that a decision-maker who attributes failure to internal factors will 
tend to ignore and or fail to fully process negative feedback, thus leading to escalation of 
commitment.  Similarly, a decision-maker who is more overconfident will follow the same 
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pattern of ignoring or failing to fully process negative feedback, thus, escalating to a greater 
extent than a decision-maker who is less overconfident.  
In addition, since it is reasonable to expect that a decision-maker who attributes failure 
internally will escalate his or her commitment to a failing project, and in the same manner that a 
decision-maker who is more overconfident is likely to escalate, in observing such behavior, a 
reasonable question to ask is: What might be the driving factor or reasons for this?  We propose 
that a desire to correct previous decisions that have produced negative outcomes is a possible 
explanation.  Consequently, a third factor to be investigated in this research is desire to rectify 
past outcomes; which may be thought of as an individual’s innate motivation to rectify previous 
losses s/he is responsible for (Staw, 1976).  Thus, this construct was examined for its potential 
mediating role between the relationship of attribution bias and overconfidence on escalation of 
commitment.   
The context within which this research was developed is that of an IT product 
development project.  This context was chosen primarily because the escalation literature 
suggests that IT projects seem extremely susceptible to escalation behavior given that they tend 
to “exhibit certain characteristics which create ambiguity” (Keil and Flatto, 1999, p. 115).  Thus, 
a number of studies suggest that IT projects possess certain characteristics (Zmud, 1980; 
DeMarco, 1982; Abdel-Hamid, 1988) that may make them particularly prone to escalation 
(Desai & Chulkov, 2009).  
 
1.4 Research Questions 
The current research was designed to address two primary research questions, and in 
doing so examine the effect of attribution bias and overconfidence on escalation of commitment.  
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In addition, the research questions reflect an investigation into the potential mediating role of 
desire to rectify past outcomes on the relationships between attribution and escalation and 
between overconfidence and escalation.  Specifically, the research questions to be investigated 
are: 
RQ1:  What effect do attribution bias and overconfidence have on escalation of 
commitment? 
RQ2:  Does desire to rectify past outcomes mediate the relationships between attribution 
bias and escalation and overconfidence and escalation? 
 
We predict that individuals who attribute the causes of a project’s setback to internal 
factors (e.g., lack of effort spent on the project), as opposed to external factors, will be more 
likely to escalate since these individuals will feel that their self-concept is being threatened.  
Consequently, instead of paying close attention to the negative feedback provided to them 
indicating that project is in trouble, these individuals will be more likely to be distracted by the 
self-justification mechanism that is typically triggered when the individual feels that his/her self 
concept is threatened; which typically leads to escalation of commitment.  On the other hand, 
individuals who attribute the cause of a project’s setback to external factors (e.g., bad luck) will 
not feel that their self-concept is being threatened and thus will be more likely to pay closer 
attention to the negative feedback indicating that the project is in trouble. These individuals will 
likely reevaluate their previous decision and be less likely to escalate than their threatened 
counterparts.   
Similarly, we argue that overconfident individuals are less motivated to renew their 
commitment to a failing course of action, as these individuals have a difficult time understanding 
the limitations of their knowledge and thus tend to overlook information (e.g., negative 
feedback) that might increase their knowledge that will facilitate decision-making. 
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1.5 Research Approach 
A web-based role-playing experiment was used to investigate the research questions.  In 
an effort to generalize study findings to our population of interest, 160 IT managers participated 
in the experiment and randomly assigned to one of two experimental treatments.  Participants 
were asked to read a hypothetical scenario describing a troubled IT project (a variation of Keil et 
al., 2007) for which they are responsible.  One treatment explicitly informs participants that 
internal factors, such as insufficient effort spent on the project and lack of skill in managing the 
product team, are the primary causes for the project’s setback.  The second treatment explicitly 
informs participants that external factors, such as task difficulty and bad luck, are the primary 
causes for the troubled project.  Participants were then asked to answer a questionnaire that 
measures escalation of commitment, the criterion variable.  In doing so, they were asked to 
decide to either re-evaluate the product (which represents de-escalation) or continue with the 
product launch as planned (which represents escalation of commitment).  This measure of 
escalation of commitment also required participants to indicate how strong their decision is.  In 
addition, the questionnaire was designed to measure each participant’s level of overconfidence.  
We specifically used the confidence quiz, developed by Russo and Schoemaker (1992), to 
measure and capture one facet2 of stable individual overconfidence; i.e., miscalibration, “the 
tendency to overestimate the precision of one's information” (Biais, Hilton, Mazurier & Pouget, 
2005, p. 287).  In essence, the quiz provides a measure of individual metaknowledge: “an 
appreciation of what we do know and what we don’t know” (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992, p. 8).  
Questions were also included to gather basic demographic data and to measure four control 
                                                
2 Overconfidence has been divided into three subareas by Moore & Healy (2008), namely, (i) overestimation 
(judgments of one’s absolute performance or ability); (ii) miscalibration or overprecision (confidence in the 
precision of one’s estimates), which is the focus of this research; and (iii) better-than-average effect or 
overplacement (appraisal of one’s relative skills and virtues) (Merkle & Weber, 2011, p. 263).  
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variables (i.e., temporariness of setback, self-efficacy, age and gender), which the literature 
indicates should have a significant effect on escalation of commitment.    
The data was analyzed using IBM SPSS-20 software.  Specifically, analysis of 
covariance and MEDIATE (Hayes & Preacher’s (2012) macro specifically designed for 
mediation analysis) were used to analyze the data.  
In summary, the current research examined attribution bias and overconfidence to help 
explain their respective effects on escalation of commitment.  In addition, an individual’s desire 
to rectify past outcomes was examined as a potential mediator of the other two factors.   
 
The remainder of this document is structured as follows:   
 §2 reviews the literature related to our constructs and the theories used to guide 
the research; 
 §3 describes hypotheses development and the research model; 
 §4 describes the research methodology (design, measures, and analysis) and study 
results; and 
 §5 provides the main discussion and conclusions, study contributions and 
limitations, and direction for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, the theoretical perspective and extant literature related to this study’s 
constructs of interest are discussed; i.e., escalation of commitment, attribution bias, 
overconfidence, and desire to rectify past outcomes.  
 
2.1 Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action 
Recalling from the previous chapter, escalation of commitment occurs when the presence 
of negative project status information, that isn’t processed appropriately, results in the 
continuation of what appears to be a failing course of action (Keil et al., 2000).  Said differently, 
escalation of commitment is the continued commitment of resources (money, time, and or effort) 
in the face of negative information (Brockner, 1992).  Three defining characteristics are typically 
present within the context of IT project escalation: losses have been incurred, one may either 
persist or withdraw from the course of action that produced the losses, and the future outcomes 
of one’s actions are uncertain (Staw, 1997, p. 192).  In the context of IT project escalation, 
negative project status refers to significant performance problems in one or more of the 
following areas: costs, schedule, functionality, or quality (Keil et al., 2000, p. 634).  In this 
research we focus primarily on quality performance problems.     
Though there are a plethora of studies that have examined the escalation of commitment 
phenomenon within various contexts, three theoretical approaches seem to dominate research on 
escalation of commitment phenomenon within the context of IT projects (Keil et al., 2000): 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and the sunk cost effect (often referred to as 
throwing good money after bad), approach avoidance theory (Brockner, Shaw, & Rubin, 1979; 
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Rubin & Brockner, 1975) and the completion effect, and self-justification theory (Staw, 1976) 
and personal responsibility. 
 
Prospect Theory and the Sunk Cost Effect 
Prospect theory (PT) (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), 
provides a framework for understanding individual decision making under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty.  PT differs from the expected utility model (“the major theory of decision-making 
under risk” Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453) in two ways.  Whereas the expected utility 
model posits that decision-making under risk follows the pattern of weighing the utility of each 
risky outcome by its probability and choosing the prospect that offers the highest utility, PT 
proposes that (1) the framing of choice problems causes significant shifts in decision preferences 
wherein outcomes are framed in either positive (gains) or negative (losses) deviations from a 
neutral reference point (the response to losses is more extreme than the response to gains); (2) 
outcomes are therefore, valued and weighted differently in terms of probability wherein 
impossible outcomes are discarded, low probabilities are over-weighted, moderate and high 
probabilities are under-weighted, and the latter effect is more pronounced than the former.  
Taken together, PT suggests that individuals exhibit either risk seeking or risk averse behavior 
depending on the framing of a given situation or problem.  Risk averse behavior is posited to 
surface when choosing between two positive alternatives.  Risk seeking behavior is posited to 
surface when the individual is required to choose between two negative alternatives, such as 
choosing between a sure loss (e.g., discontinuing a project for which a significant investment of 
resources has already been expended) and the possibility of a greater loss (a combination of the 
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initial investment plus more resources spent) in an effort to return to a reference point.  Such 
behavior is commonly observed in gambling situations (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).   
Whyte (1986) suggests that PT could help explain the sunk-cost effect, which seems to 
occur when the decision-maker adopts a negative frame.  Such negative mental framing is 
posited to promote risk-seeking behavior commonly observed in escalation situations.  In short, 
the sunk-cost effect relates to the notion that the more resources (e.g., time, money, and effort) 
spent on an investment, the more likely a decision maker will escalate commitment. 
 
Approach Avoidance Theory and the Completion Effect 
 Approach avoidance theory (AAT) suggests that in an escalation situation there exist two 
competing forces.  One driving force consists of things that encourage persistence (e.g., 
proximity to the goal and the size of the reward for goal attainment), while the other force 
consists of things that encourage abandonment (e.g., the cost of persistence).  Thus, escalation 
behavior is said to occur under AAT when the force encouraging persistence is greater than the 
force encouraging abandonment (Brockner & Rubin, 1985).     
Decision-makers in an escalation situation act as if they have “too much invested to quit” 
(Teger, 1979).  Thus, the desire to continue with a goal as time passes, known as the completion 
effect, surpasses the desire to minimize cost-benefit ratios.  As discussed in Keil et al. (2000), the 
completion effect suggests that the "motivation to achieve a goal increases as an individual gets 
closer to that goal" (Conlon & Garland 1993, p. 403).  Research suggests that the completion 
effect is indeed a problem with IT projects.  For instance, Keil, Mann, and Rai (2000) found that 
in a survey of IT auditors the completion effect classiﬁed more than 70 percent of runaway 
projects. 
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Self-Justification and Personal Responsibility 
 Drawing from psychology literature, Staw (1976) was the first to apply Festinger’s 
(1957) theory of cognitive dissonance to organizational escalation behavior.  Festinger suggests 
that cognitive dissonance is the foundation that motivates behavior, which is posited to be caused 
by the individual’s desire to strive toward consistency of beliefs, discard contradictory 
occurrences of such beliefs, and thus avoid or discount any information that will increase 
dissonance.  In Staw’s (1976) seminal work and widely cited Knee Deep in the Big Muddy, he 
was the first to introduce self-justification theory (SJT) as a potential explanation for escalation 
of commitment.  The central premise of SJT is that the more decision makers are responsible for 
a previously chosen course of action that results in negative consequences, the more likely they 
are to increase the commitment of resources (e.g., time, effort, and or money) and undergo the 
risk of further negative consequences despite receiving negative information about the initial 
decision (Staw, 1976).  As Staw (1976) explains, such biasing is said to occur because the 
individual seeks to psychologically defend him/herself against unfavorable consequences and or 
rationalize his/her previous behavior (Aronson, 1968, 1972; Festinger, 1957).  To test SJT 
assumptions on escalation of commitment, Staw (1976) invited 240 business school students to 
participate in a role-playing exercise that simulated a business investment decision to a particular 
product division.  Personal responsibility and decision consequences were manipulated as 
independent variables.  Results indicated that when individuals are personally responsible for 
negative consequences they are more likely, than individuals not personally responsible for 
negative consequences, to commit the greatest amount of resources to a previously chosen course 
of action (Staw, 1976, p. 24).   
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Since Staw’s initial work (1976), researchers have continued to expand on self-
justification processes and psychological determinants as an explanation for escalation of 
commitment by introducing the effect of other variables such as time, where a decrease in 
commitment has been observed over time (e.g., McCain, 1986; Staw & Fox, 1977), the desire to 
externally justify actions to others apparently more so than to oneself (Fox & Staw, 1979), and 
the need to appear rational (Bazerman, Beckun, & Schoorman, 1982).  In addition, Caldwell and 
O'Reilly (1982) found support for the notion that individuals use selective information in a 
conscious effort to manage or interpret signals of failure.   
In summary, self-justification processes are posited to be the underlying causes for 
escalation behavior (Staw, 1980), and serve as the foundation for psychological explanations, for 
escalation of commitment including the effect of cognitive biases.   
Keil et al. (2000) inform us that in the face of negative feedback, managers are aware of 
negative information, but choose to ignore it due to certain cognitive biases that can promote 
escalation.  Though a few studies (e.g., Depledge, 2003; Keil et al., 2007) have examined the 
effect of cognitive biases on escalation of commitment, this research focus still remains 
relatively unexplored in the literature.  To this point Keil et al. (2007, p. 411) state: “…future 
research may profitably address the effects of other biases.”  Specifically, researchers have called 
for the examination of overconfidence, in addition to other cognitive biases, and ask if such 
biases lead to escalation of commitment (Depledge, 2003; Keil et al., 2007).   
 
Cognitive Bias and Decision-Making 
Social cognition refers to “cognitive processes and structures (e.g., self-conceptions, 
standards, goals) through which individuals assign personal meaning to events, plan courses of 
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action, and regulate their motivation, emotion, and interpersonal behavior” (Cervone, 1991, p. 
372).  As part of the cognition process, individuals seek to make sense of their own behavior as 
well as others.  In doing so, justifications are often necessary to achieve the desired perception 
(James & Mazerolle, 2002).   
Managerial decision-making is one instance during which such processes of cognitions 
play a major role.  During decision-making, the decision-maker is typically faced with 
information that will facilitate the decision-process.  Thus, the decision-maker must process the 
information cognitively (frame and analyze).  To illustrate framing, some people view working 
hard on a demanding task as “being overloaded and stressed”, whereas others may frame it as 
“intrinsically motivated and job involved” (James & Mazerolle, 2002, p. 35).  Mental framing 
serves as input into the process of mental analysis, which entails drawing inferences about the 
probability of, for example, failing or succeeding at a project.  However, within this process of 
framing and analyzing, Hogarth (1987) informs us that decision-making is always subject to 
cognitive bias.  Cognitive bias is an error in human judgment, which can be caused by social 
attribution, memory, and statistical error (Shefrin, 2007).   
Since little research has been conducted on the effect of cognitive biases on escalation of 
commitment, this research provided us with the opportunity to add to this limited body of 
research.  Two cognitive biases which have been examined within the context of IT project 
escalation are selective perception and illusion of control Keil et al. (2007); both of which were 
found to be positively related to IT project escalation.  Thus, in this research we explore other 
cognitive biases that might play a similar role in IT project escalation.  While researchers (e.g., 
Sage, 1981; Hogarth, 1987) have identified over 20 different cognitive biases, this study focuses 
on attribution bias and overconfidence.  These biases were chosen as a research focus for this 
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study because they appear to be among the more likely biases to play a role in escalation 
decisions as discussed by fellow researchers (e.g., see Staw & Ross, 1978; Keil et al., 2007).  
 
2.2 Attribution Bias 
Individuals regularly make attributions regarding the cause(s) for their own and others’ 
behaviors.  However, in doing so attributions are not always accurately aligned with reality since 
individuals rarely operate as objective perceivers.  Instead, individuals are prone to perceptual 
errors that lead to biased interpretations of the world they live in (Funder, 1987; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980).   
The origins of decision-making based on the presence of internal versus external factors 
attributed to a given setback, can be traced back to attribution theory.  Originally developed 
within the field of social psychology, “attribution theory (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones, Kanouse, 
Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, & Weiner, 1972; Kelley, 1973) deals with the explanation of effects via 
the identification of their causes” (Kruglanski, 1975, p. 387).  In other words, attribution theory 
provides an account of how people make causal inferences and how this information affects 
decision-making (Kelley, 1973).  Attribution theory primarily deals with questions of social 
perception (e.g., If a person fails on a test, does s/he have low ability, or is the test difficult?), 
and such questions concern the causes of observed behavior (Kelley, 1973).   
 Within the context of escalation situations, attribution refers to causal information 
ascribed to a given setback (or success).  Causal information is typically categorized as internal 
versus external (Kelley, 1967) or as endogenous versus exogenous (Kruglanski, 1975).  The 
difference from one categorization to the other mainly depends on the stage of the inference 
process.  The inference process consists of two stages.  During the first stage the attributor 
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identifies the cause (internal versus external) of a given effect (e.g., setback), and the second 
stage entails the causal explanation (endogenous versus exogenous) or conclusions drawn about 
the effect once its cause is known (Kruglanski, 1975).  For instance, the known cause for a 
setback in an IT project could relate to factors such as costs, schedule, functionality, or quality 
(Keil et al., 2000).  This research is primarily concerned with the latter classification; i.e., quality 
issues being attributed to the setback in question and the biases that can arise from such 
attributions. 
Attribution bias refers to the tendency of individuals to attribute their successes to their 
own efforts, abilities or other dispositions (internal factors), and to attribute their failures to bad 
luck, inherent difficulty of the task, and or various environmental factors (external factors) 
(Bradley, 1978; Miller & Ross, 1975).  In short, attribution bias is said to occur when individuals 
attribute success internally and failure externally (Duval & Silvia, 2002).  With attribution bias, 
the analysis of negative performance feedback is typically driven by external locus of causality 
(though not always, as discussed shortly) because such causal processing is characterized by low 
controllability and low temporal stability (Weiner, 1986). 
Though attribution research clearly demonstrates that internal success attributions are 
consistently found (e.g., Miller & Ross, 1975), research has also shown that this effect is not 
consistent for failures (Duval & Silvia (2002).  Specifically, studies have shown that individuals 
also attribute failure to internal causes (e.g., Ames, 1975; Ross, Bierbrauer, & Polly, 1974; 
Weary et al., 1982).  For instance, in a study examining the effect of self-awareness and 
possibility of improvement, it was observed that under certain conditions (i.e., when probability 
for future improvement and self-awareness are perceived to be high), people attribute failure 
internally (Duval & Silvia, 2002).   
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Bradley (1978) provides a similar assessment as Duval & Silvia by claiming that under 
certain conditions people attribute setbacks internally, thus displaying, what is referred to as, 
counterdefensive attributions.  For instance, in the case of public-esteem needs individuals may 
believe that they are best served by accepting responsibility for negative outcomes; e.g., to 
appear to be modest or humble (e.g., Wortman, Costanzo, & Witt, 1973).  The conditions when 
this might be the case, Bradley explains, is if the individual “is explicitly told that his 
performance is the major object of study and if his too positive self-presentation could be 
invalidated by his own subsequent behavior or by others' present/future assessments of his 
performance” (p. 66).  In this case, with such visibility of the individual’s ability or lack there of, 
the individual is inclined to take personal responsibility for negative outcomes and thus attribute 
the causes for failure internally.  Thus, one could then argue that with a reversal of attribution 
bias, the analysis of negative performance feedback would be driven by internal locus of 
causality. 
Since it is possible that the cause of poor performance can be the result of internal factors 
or the result of external factors, one could then ask, when does an attribution become biased, as 
both factors (internal and external) constitute a plausible explanation for negative (or positive) 
performance?  James & Mazerolle (2002) explain that during the attribution process a purely 
rational model would take into consideration both perspectives, internal and external factors, as 
plausible explanations for performance.  Conversely, biased attributions would favor only one 
factor (internal or external) as a plausible explanation for performance.  A natural follow-up 
question to the one just examined, would be to ask, what factors induce attributional biases?  
The attribution literature informs us that several factors, such as gender and certain 
individual traits (e.g., self-esteem), have shown to produce different attributions.  For example, 
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females tend to attribute their success to luck rather than to ability, and to rate their ability lower 
more so than males (Bar-Tal, 1978); following failure, individuals with low self-esteem tend to 
make more internal attributions (Marsh, 1986); and high need achievers attribute their success to 
internal factors such as ability and effort, whereas low need achievers attribute their failure to 
lack of ability and success to luck or an easy task (Scapinello, 1988).   
Expanding on Scapinello’s point, James & Mazerolle (2002) explain that some 
individuals (e.g., achievement motivated individuals3) possess an unconscious tendency “to 
assume that internal causes are more important than external causes when they make attributions 
about the causes of performance” (p. 36), regardless of the performance resulting from success or 
failure.  Thus, these individuals are unconsciously biased toward finding that internal factors, 
such as commitment and effort, are the primary causes of performance.  Individuals who 
attribute success and failure internally tend to frame obstacles as an opportunity to improve and 
achieve.  They tend to think that (a) through training, practice, and experience they can develop 
the skills to successfully accomplish a demanding task (Dweck & Leggett, 1988); and (b) that 
successfully accomplishing a demanding task is not only possible, but also controllable through 
their efforts.  This type of framing and analysis in individuals who attribute internally is what 
gives rise to a self-justification mechanism that promotes persistence on difficult tasks (James & 
Mazerolle, 2002).   
Conversely, some individuals (e.g., individuals who have a strong need to avoid failure) 
have an unconscious tendency to believe that the primary cause of success or failure on a task is 
the result of external factors that are beyond their control.  Individuals who attribute success and 
failure externally tend to avoid situations for which the possibility of success is uncertain, as this 
                                                
3 Achievement motivated individuals are those whose motive to achieve overshadows the motive to avoid failure 
(James & Rentsch, 2004).   
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creates a high degree of debilitating anxiety for them, which they tend to avoid.  Thus, they 
prefer a strategy of avoidance or withdrawal on tasks that seem too demanding or likely to fail 
(James & Mazerolle, 2002).  In summary, individual differences are likely to produce different 
attributional biases.  Thus, one would expect that such differences would also affect individual 
decision-making.  
In examining some of the antecedents of attribution bias, the literature informs us that 
decision-makers tend to be more biased in their attributions when they experience high social 
anxiety and when they are highly responsible for the performance of outcomes.  In addition, it is 
said to occur more often following negative, as opposed to positive, feedback related to the 
performance of prior decisions (Arkin, Appelman, & Burger, 1980; Brockner, 1979).  Put 
together, it is this type of biasing that leads individuals into making poor decisions, as it prevents 
them from fully processing and appreciating feedback regarding their performance, and instead it 
motivates them to defend themselves or self-enhance.  Thus, it is a concept closely related to 
self-esteem.  By embarking in the process of self-enhancing or defending self-esteem, biased 
decision-makers may perceive a negative situation quite differently from reality.  Consequently, 
a high motivation to defend the self against predetermined standards may result in a biased 
vision of the future so that the decision-maker is more inclined, than those not in need of 
defending themselves (as would be the case with setbacks being exogenously explained), to seek 
a self-defending mechanism to their prior course of action (Duval and Silvia, 2002; Scapinello, 
1988).   
Research examining the effect of attribution on resource allocation and commitment 
decisions provides insight into IT escalation situations.  For instance, Staw & Ross (1978) 
conducted an experimental simulation in which subjects played the role of a decision maker in 
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the World Bank and were asked to allocate resources to one of several regions.  Their level of 
commitment was measured following a financial setback.  The factors examined and 
experimentally manipulated were: prior success or failure experience and exogenous or 
endogenous causal information pertaining to the setback.  It was noted in the study however, that 
the endogenous-exogenous manipulation consisted of two subfactors: the foreseeability and 
persistence of the cause of the setback.  These subfactors were always varied together as part of 
each manipulation condition so as to achieve a setback either high in foreseeability and 
persistence or low in foreseeability and persistence.  The exogenous setback was always low in 
foreseeability and low in persistence whereas the endogenous setback was always high in both 
foreseeability and persistence.  
The exogenous factor was represented by a large amount of rain in the region in question.  
Examples of endogenous factors were government corruption and high level of illiteracy within 
the region where an allocation decision had to be made.  The interaction between a prior failure 
and a setback attributed to an exogenous factor (i.e., excessive rainfall in the chosen region), 
resulted in the greatest amount of resources committed than did the experimental treatment a 
prior failure and a setback attributed to endogenous factors (i.e., corruption in the area and 
population not responsive to work incentives).  Though, in accordance with self-justification 
theory, one would expect that being directly responsible for the initial decision of funding the 
project would lead to escalation of commitment in the face of negative feedback, the literature 
doesn’t provide an account for what will happen when individuals are manipulated into believing 
that internal versus external factors are the cause for a setback from a self-justification process 
(Staw, 1978); a research gap this study addresses. 
Typically, in studies examining the effect of attribution bias, participants are asked to 
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perform some task, manipulated into believing that they performed poorly (or successfully) on 
the task, and then asked to attribute the causes for the adverse (or positive) outcome.  As 
previously mentioned, the present study takes a different approach by experimentally 
manipulating subjects into either believing that the cause for a project’s setback is due to internal 
or external factors.  We propos that a self-justification mechanism will be triggered when a 
setback is said to have been caused by internal factors, and thus prompt more escalation, whereas 
less escalation will occur when a setback is said to have been caused by external factors, as a 
self-justifying mechanism shouldn’t be triggered.   
In summary, causal attributions (internal versus external) assigned to setbacks may 
engender biases that affect decision-making that may lead to escalation of commitment.  Thus, if 
a decision-maker attributes a project’s setback internally, this may trigger a self-justification 
mechanism that can lead to escalation.  
 
2.3 Overconfidence  
Overconfidence refers to the tendency to be unjustifiably certain of one’s ability to 
predict accurately.  But before further discussion about overconfidence, which typically implies 
that it always leads to negative consequences, it’s important to note, as proposed by Chira, 
Adams, & Thornton (2008), that overconfidence doesn’t necessarily have to be viewed as a 
negative trait, but rather a positive trait that can lead to survival both in the short and long run.  
However, the negativity of the bias surfaces in situations when individuals can’t appreciate their 
limitations and therefore, make faulty decisions based on erroneous beliefs. 
Overconfidence informs us of individual metaknowledge which “concerns a higher level 
of expertise: understanding the nature, scope, and limits of our basic or primary knowledge” 
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(Russo & Schoemaker, 1992, p. 8).  As discussed in Russo & Schoemaker, the importance of the 
metaknowledge versus primary knowledge distinction can be appreciated when, for instance, a 
person knows when to see a doctor or a lawyer (metaknowledge) as opposed to how much one 
knows about law and medicine (primary knowledge).  The implication of metaknowledge on 
business decision-making is based on the notion that individuals draw from metaknowledge 
when they conclude that they have enough information to make a decision in the present 
moment.  However, if in reality we make a decision when we’re not ready, it could lead to costly 
mistakes (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992).   
In general, overconfidence occurs when a decision makers’ beliefs about the quality of 
his/her performance exceeds actual performance (Stone, 1994).  Closely related to other 
constructs such as self-efficacy (Stone, 1994; Whyte, Saks, & Hook, 1997) and overoptimism 
(Weinstein, 1980), in the present study we operationalize overconfidence as individual 
miscalibration that is observed when people are asked for a range that is assumed to contain a 
true value with a certain probability (e.g., 90 percent), but instead they choose extremely narrow 
confidence intervals (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982; Russo & Schoemaker, 1992).  For instance, an 
example of miscalibration is found in Biais et al. (2005) wherein the behavior of 245 participants 
were observed in an experimental financial market under asymmetric information.  Empirical 
results suggest that miscalibrated traders had a reduction in trading performance in comparison 
to calibrated traders. 
According to Pallier et al. (2002), there are two prominent theoretical models used to 
explain the overconfidence and underconfidence phenomenon, namely, the heuristics and biases 
approach (see, e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) and the ecological approach (see, e.g., 
  
 30 
Gigerenzer, 1991).  In the current research we subscribe to the heuristics and biases model of 
overconfidence (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).   
Although the notion of overconfidence has been challenged in previous literature, 
suggesting, among other factors, that its cause can be attributed to research methodology and 
experimental design, and that it can be explained by rational information processing, such as 
Bayesian updating, rather than biased self-evaluations (e.g., Benoît & Dubra, 2009), Merkle and 
Weber (2011) find empirical support suggesting that overconfidence is indeed “the consequence 
of a psychological bias” (p. 262).  Thus, it is acknowledged that overconfidence is considered 
among the behavioral biases most readily accepted by economic and finance researchers (Merkle 
& Weber, 2011).   
Overconfidence has been examined within various contexts and has been related to 
excessive trading volume (Barber & Odean, 2000; Glaser & Weber, 2007; and Odean, 1998), to 
the emergence of stock market bubbles (Scheinkman & Xiong, 2003; Shiller, 2002), to corporate 
investment decisions (Gervais, Heaton, & Odean, 2003; Malmendier & Tate, 2005), and to the 
predictability of market returns (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998).  Other areas of 
research include venture formation and entrepreneurship, which suggests that because new 
entrepreneurs tend to seek out more information before committing to decisions, than do 
experienced ones, they exhibit less overconfidence (Cooper, Folta, & Woo, 1995). 
Investigation into the factors that explain overconfidence, such as greater information 
volume, expertise, and gender, are among the factors examined in the literature.  For instance, 
most noted in investment decision-making, security analysts have access to large volumes of 
information on some industries and companies; particularly companies which are actively 
trading (Schwenk, 1986).  However, as discussed in Schwenk, in a series of studies conducted by 
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Dreman (1979), significant evidence was found for the claim that when security analyst had 
additional information on highly visible stocks, that the additional information did not result in 
greater predictive performance related to the stock.  In other words, security analysts’ forecast 
accuracy performance decreased when the analyst had more information about the stock.  Thus, 
Dreman concluded that an increase in information volume only increased the investor and 
advisor’s overconfidence in their own ability to predict a company’s stock performance at the 
expense of decreasing accuracy prediction.  Similarly, in their investigation on whether or not 
venture capitalists (VC) are overconfident and how such overconfidence affects decision-
making, Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) also found that as more information becomes available, 
people tend to believe they will make a better and more informed decision.  However, it was 
found that the availability of more information lead to a decrease in VC decision accuracy 
(Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001).  
Moreover, experts rather than novices tend to be more overconfident (Griffin & Tversky, 
1992; Koehler, Brenner, & Grifﬁn, 2002).  And although results are mixed, in general, males, in 
comparison to females, tend to be more overconfident (Barber & Odean, 2001; Lichtenstein & 
Fischhoff, 1981; Pallier, 2003; Soll & Klayman, 2004).  
Research on the relationship between overconfidence and decision-making informs us 
that decision makers with higher levels of overconfidence tend not to recognize inaccurate 
perception of risk during the decision-making process (Simon & Houghton, 2003; Simon 
Houghton, & Aquino, 2000), and may have more trouble in recognizing their irrational way of 
information processing and the need to attain more knowledge prior to decision-making (Merkle 
& Weber, 2011).  
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Decision makers with higher levels of overconfidence tend to be less concessionary in the 
decisions that they make, which can consequently lead to their commitment to a prior course of 
action (Neale & Bazerman, 1985).  This notion is supported in the management literature, which 
suggests that people high in overconfidence may have a greater challenge in revisiting their prior 
decision when the competitive environment changes (Moore & Cain, 2007).  
 Typically, in studies examining overconfidence, participants are asked to provide an 
estimated lower and upper limit confidence interval to ten questions such that participants are 90 
percent certain that the correct answer for each question will fall within the limits provided.  By 
calculating the participant’s accuracy rate and comparing it with 90 percent, we obtain their 
metaknowledge score (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992).  Calibrated individuals should, for example, 
be accurate on 90 percent of the judgments to which they give confidence judgments of 90 
percent.  Research shows that overconfidence is a common phenomenon.  For example, in a 
series of laboratory studies people were asked to provide confidence intervals around numerical 
judgments (e.g., "I am 95 percent certain that there are between 500 and 700 pennies in the jar").   
The results indicated that it was not unusual “for the actual number of pennies to fall outside the 
95 percent boundaries for 50 percent of all subjects” (Bazerman & Neale, 1983, p. 38). 
While initial research has theorized a relationship between overconfidence and 
escalation (e.g., Banff & Ni, 2006), said relationship has not been empirically tested; a 
research gap the current study addresses. 
In summary, overconfidence, is a cognitive bias that affects the tendency to 
escalate commitment when decision makers overestimate the level of accuracy of their 
judgments on their ability to yield positive results (Schwenk, 1986). 
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2.4 Desire to Rectify Past Outcomes (DRPO) 
Self-justification theory informs us that after the individual is faced with negative 
consequences, which have resulted from the individual’s own failings, the individual embarks on 
a process of self-justification to protect his/her ego or self-esteem (Staw & Ross, 1978).  In other 
words, by escalating their commitment to a previously chosen course of action, the decision-
maker can prove that their initial decision, for example, to launch a product within a given time 
frame, is the correct decision.  Self-justification theory also states that individuals might increase 
their commitment in order to protect themselves from psychological distress due to perceived 
failure.  
According to Staw (1978), “the major theoretical contribution of a self-justification 
mechanism is that it posits a form of retrospective as opposed to prospective rationality.”  In 
other words, the individual is more likely to focus upon those events that facilitate the correction 
or reduction of the magnitude of a previous error rather than focusing prospectively “on new and 
alternative ways to increase outcomes” (Staw, 1981, p. 44).  To clarify, the “new and alternative 
way” assumed by prospective rationality, would have nothing or little to do with the previous 
action (e.g., precious decisions made about the project in question) that resulted in a loss, 
whereas retrospective rationality would entail correcting a past mistake by continuing 
commitment to a failing course of action.  To this point, Staw (1981) proposes that commitment 
decisions are at least in part determined by a desire to correct or rectify past outcomes.  
Formally, desire to rectify past outcomes refers to an individual’s innate motivation to 
correct previous losses s/he is responsible for.  The origin of this construct lies in self-
justification theory assumptions about decision-makers’ desire to psychologically defend 
themselves against (a) previous decisions that have resulted in negative consequences or (b) to 
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rationalize previous behavior (Staw, 1976).  In other words, an explicit assumption of the self-
justification process is that, given negative outcomes from past decisions, individuals become 
motivated to rectify erroneous judgments by becoming more committed to a previous decision 
(Staw, 1981).  However, this assumption has not been directly tested in the escalation of 
commitment literature, and thus in this study we propose to address this gap in the literature by 
operationalizing this assumed desire and refer to it, in Staw’s language, as desire to rectify past 
outcomes (hereafter, DRPO). 
In summary, DRPO is posited to serve as the mechanism that underlies the relationship 
between this study’s predictor variables and criterion variable.  Thus, we posit that DRPO will 
play a mediating role in the proposed escalation model discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
To help answer this study’s research questions, in this chapter we discuss the 
development of the proposed research model and the hypotheses to be tested.  As a reminder, the 
focus of this research is to investigate the following research questions:  
RQ1:  What effect do attribution bias and overconfidence have on escalation of 
commitment? 
RQ2:  Does desire to rectify past outcomes mediate the relationships between attribution 
bias and escalation and overconfidence and escalation? 
 
The research model (Figure 1) represents four testable hypotheses for this study’s 
escalation of commitment framework, which includes four constructs: attribution (predictor 
variable), overconfidence (predictor variable), desire to rectify past outcomes (mediating 
variable), and escalation of commitment (criterion variable).  The figure also depicts a list of 
variables that past literature has suggested leads to escalation of commitment, namely: self-
efficacy, temporariness of the setback, gender, and age (control variables).  
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Figure 1: The Research Model 
 
                                               
 The hypothesized relationships between each predictor variable, mediating variable and 
the criterion variable are discussed in turn.  But first, the contention of how biases can lead to 
escalation of commitment within the context of IT projects is based on the following argument. 
One of the primary goals of an IT project manager is to ensure the successful completion of the 
project while also staying within schedule and budget constraints without sacrificing any of the 
other goals of the assignment, such as beating competitors to market.  As a result, IT managers 
may become convinced that a buggy product should be launched anyway so as not to lose a first 
mover advantage and to stay within the prescribed budget and schedule.   If IT managers are 
susceptible to cognitive biases that can impair their reasoning and judgment, this could lead them 
to attach a higher probability of product success than is realistic, and thus lead them to escalation 
of commitment.  
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3.1  Attribution Bias and Escalation of Commitment 
Recalling from the previous chapter, there are biases that can arise during the decision-
making process depending on the attributions individuals assign to the causes of a setback.  For 
instance, while attribution bias (i.e., the tendency of individuals to attribute their successes to 
internal factors, and to attribute their failures to external factors) may arise as a result of negative 
consequences, it is also known that the reverse, i.e., counterdefensive bias, may also result when 
attributing failures internally.  
According to self-justification assumptions (Staw & Ross, 1978), when individuals are 
provided with attributional causes for a setback, and such causes are attributed to internal factors, 
individuals will be motivated to self-enhance or self-protect.  For instance, in a launch as planned 
or re-evaluate decision, of a software product that has been met with a setback (e.g., recently 
discovered bugs in the software), in which failure may result if the product is launched as 
planned without correcting the bugs, if the decision maker attributes the bugs to internal causes 
(e.g., lack of skill in managing the product team and insufficient effort spent on the project), s/he 
may choose to ignore the feedback and escalate commitment in an effort to self-enhance or self-
protect.  The underlying mechanism that triggers this effect is based on the notion that when 
negative results are attributed to internal factors, it leads individuals to engage in retrospective 
rationality, which can lead to “costly cycles of escalation” (Staw, 1978, p. 44).  One mechanism, 
by which individuals can self-protect from previous decisions that have resulted in negative 
consequences, is to frame obstacles as an opportunity to improve and achieve goals.  In this 
situation, the individual tends to think that through his/her efforts s/he can successfully 
accomplish a demanding task (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).  Engaging in this form of self-
justification is what promotes persistence in challenging tasks (James & Mazerolle, 2002).  
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On the other hand, if decision-makers attribute the cause of a setback to external factors 
(e.g. bad luck and inherent difficulty of the project itself), they have little motivation to self-
protect, as they were not directly responsible for the setback in question (e.g., the setback could 
be perceived as being due to factors outside of their control).  Thus, their self-image is less likely 
to be threatened and thus, a self-justification mechanism would not be triggered.  This being the 
case, individuals are less likely to engage in retrospective thinking and more likely to engage in 
prospective rationality or to think about how to improve in the future.  A starting point for 
prospective rationality might be to become cognizant of the negative feedback provided and thus, 
decide to re-evaluate the product prior to launching instead of launching it as planned.  Thus, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: Individuals who attribute the causes of a project’s setback to internal factors will be more 
likely to escalate their commitment than individuals who attribute the causes of the setback 
to external factors. 
 
3.2 Overconfidence and Escalation of Commitment 
 Overconfidence could lead to escalation of commitment by various means, such as 
through the process of probability assessment, lack of risk perception, inaccurate information 
processing, and misjudgment of knowledge on the part of the decision-maker.   
The level of confidence with which a decision-maker evaluates the likelihood of a 
particular product launch being successful in the marketplace addresses the issue of probability 
assessment during the decision-making process.  For instance, a decision-maker may attach a 
probability rate of 80 percent that the product launch will be a success.  However, as 
demonstrated in the literature, “people generally tend to be overconfident in judging their 
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chances of success” (Bazerman & Neale, 1983, p. 38).  As such, faced with negative feedback 
indicating the unlikely success of a product launch, overconfident decision-makers may ignore 
the feedback since they attached a greater probability of success for the product launch than is 
realistic.  Thus, they will escalate their commitment to their prior decision and launch as planned.  
Also, since overconfident decision-makers have difficulty recognizing risk during the 
decision-making process (Simon & Houghton, 2003; Simon Houghton, & Aquino, 2000), it is 
likely that an overconfident IT manager who, for example, is trying to decide whether to launch 
or re-evaluate a troubled product, may have difficulty recognizing the risk of ruining the 
company’s reputation or losing market share by launching a “buggy” product.  
Decision makers with higher levels of overconfidence tend to be less flexible or willing 
to change a previous point of view in the decisions that they make (Neale & Bazerman, 1985).  
The reason for this is that overconfident individuals tend to gloss over or inaccurately process 
information that for example, points to a setback in their previous decisions.  They may also fail 
to recognize that a problem exist due to their inability of recognizing their weakness in lack of 
knowledge.  For instance, IT managers may be well equipped and knowledgeable about 
developing software, however, when a setback is made known, overconfident managers may 
choose to ignore the new information (e.g., negative feedback about the product’s quality) and 
launch the product as planned because they are unaware that they lack knowledge about, for 
example, the marketing process and the repercussions of launching a faulty product into the 
marketplace.  This overestimation of their knowledge can have serious consequences for the 
outcome of decisions.  If decision makers had more accurately assessed their level of knowledge 
so that it reflects a calibrated individual (an individual that is not overconfident), they might have 
behaved quite differently in terms of remaining committed to their initial decision and 
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information gathering in order to make a well informed decision that will lead to the successful 
launch of their product.  In short, overconfidence should decrease decision makers’ willingness 
to concede as it prompts them to misjudge the amount of knowledge necessary to de-escalate (or 
re-evaluate their initial decision). 
Given the previous discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2: Individuals who are more overconfident will escalate their commitment to a greater 
extent than individuals who are less overconfident.   
 
3.3 The Mediating Role of Desire to Rectify Past Outcomes  
Up to this point we’ve argued that internal attribution and high overconfidence will have 
a main effect on escalation of commitment.  In this section, we argue for the potential mediating 
role of DRPO on the relationships between attribution bias and escalation and between 
overconfidence and escalation.  
Since it is reasonable to expect that when a project setback is attributed to a decision-
maker’s own failings s/he will tend to escalate, and similarly that a highly overconfident 
decision-maker will also tend to escalate; in observing such behavior, a reasonable question to 
ask is: What might be the driving factor or reasons for this?  We propose that a desire to correct 
previous decisions that have produced negative outcomes (i.e., desire to rectify past outcomes or 
DRPO) is a possible explanation.  The reason for this posited effect is based on self-justification 
theory assumptions. 
According to Staw (1976), an individual may desire to demonstrate rationality to 
him/herself or restore a sense of consistency between the negative consequences of his actions 
and or self-concept of rational decision-making (Aronson, 1968).  This line of reasoning is not 
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new, as it has been demonstrated by other lines of research, such as theories of consistency (see 
Abelson, Aronson, McGuire, Newcomb, Rosenberg, & Tannebaum, 1968), cognitive dissonance 
(e.g., Festinger, 1957), and the innate desire that individuals have to be correct (Whyte, 1959).   
This desire to make things right or to be correct, can also be an attempt to prove one’s 
competency to others, for example, “that a costly error was really the correct decision over a 
longer term perspective” (Staw, 1976, p. 42).  This latter form of self-justification, according to 
Staw, would be more important in an organizational setting where a decision-maker’s status in 
relation to his/her peers is uncertain.  Nonetheless, both forms of self-justification can be viewed 
as face-saving events (Goffman, 1959) or having a desire for social approval (Crowne & 
Marlow, 1964). 
Given the past discussion, it seems reasonable to expect that attribution bias and 
overconfidence leads to escalation via the mediating path of DRPO.  For instance, in the case of 
an escalation situation, when failure has been attributed internally, individuals are motivated to 
protect their self-concept, particularly when there is a chance for recouping losses in the long-
term.  One mechanism by which previous losses or negative outcomes can be rectified is by 
escalating commitment to a previous course of action, as this would provide the decision-maker 
with the opportunity to regain and or protect his/her self-image. In the mind of the decision-
maker, launching the product on time would provide the opportunity to generate revenue from 
product sales more quickly, than delaying the launch, and consequently proving that he/she made 
the correct decision in the first place.  
Similarly, people that are overconfident would also be motivated to correct past errors in 
the face of negative consequences resulting from their decisions.  One possible explanation for 
this tendency is that overconfident people have a strong desire to attain higher social status 
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(Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012) and boost their ego.  Thus, in the face of negative 
feedback overconfident individuals, who tend to believe that they are competent, will be 
motivated to rectify past outcomes to justify their competence, which in turn will boost their ego.  
One mechanism by which this desired state of competence could be attained is by escalating 
their commitment to their previous decision.  Given the previous discussion, the following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
H3: Desire to rectify past outcomes will mediate the effect of attribution on escalation. 
H4: Desire to rectify past outcomes will mediate the effect of overconfidence on escalation. 
 
The four hypotheses to be tested are summarized in Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis Description 
H1 Individuals who attribute the causes of a project’s setback to internal factors will be more likely 
to escalate their commitment than individuals who attribute the causes of the setback to external 
factors. 
H2 Individuals who are more overconfident will escalate their commitment to a greater extent than 
individuals who are less overconfident.   
H3 Desire to rectify past outcomes will mediate the effect of attribution on escalation. 
H4 Desire to rectify past outcomes will mediate the effect of overconfidence on escalation. 
Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
This chapter describes the research setting, subjects, research design, data collection and 
instrument, operationalization of variables, the data analysis strategy, and study results. 
 
4.1 Research Approach: Setting and Participants 
To answer our research questions and test the hypotheses developed in the previous 
chapter, 160 IT managers were recruited to participate in a web-based role-playing experiment.  
The minimum target number of subjects (N= 68) was selected a priori using the following input 
parameters: 2 predictor variables, medium effect size, 0.80 power, and 0.05 probability level 
(online calculator: http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc3/calc.aspx?id=1).  There were a total of 
160 participants, 100 men, 59 women, and one participant not reporting their gender or age.   
The mean age of participants was 47.84, with a median of 48, minimum of 25, and maximum 
age of 74 (standard deviation = 11.3).  
An experimental design was chosen as the most fitting to answer our research questions, 
for four main reasons.  First, extant literature provides a means to determine an appropriate 
choice for the use of a given methodology.  Examples of relevant studies using an experimental 
design to examine psychological factors and escalation of commitment include: Depledge, 2003; 
Keil et al., 2007; Biyalogorsky et al., 2006; Staw & Ross, 1978; Staw, 1976 – to name only a 
few.  Second, from a practical point of view, it would be very difficult to examine the effect of 
attribution and cognitive biases on decision-making using a case study; which would call for 
actual decision-making.  Third, an experimental design allows us to establish internal validity, 
which is critical when testing theories (Keil et al., 2007).  It also allows for a high degree of 
control over extraneous variables and measurement accuracy, so that causal relationships can be 
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established within the research model (DeSanctis, 1989).  Lastly, a major strength of 
experimental research lies in its ease of replicability, thus, allowing researchers to replicate the 
study with another subject group to further validate the experimental results.  
 
4.2 Experimental Design and Procedure 
Data collection took place December 2012 through March 2013.  Data collection was 
facilitated by the market research company eSearch.com.  The primary role of eSearch.com was 
to identify a qualified sample of IT Managers with the following selection criteria: a survey 
response time of at least eight minutes4 and passing the manipulation check.  Each participant 
was invited via email communication to participate in the study on a voluntary basis.  The email 
invitation described the study’s purpose, consent information, and a link to the web-based 
scenario and survey instrument.  SurveyMonkey™, an online survey company, hosted the 
survey.  
Upon arrival to the website, participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
experimental treatment groups.  80 participants were assigned to the internal attribution 
experimental treatment and another 80 participants were assigned to the external attribution 
experimental treatment.  After reading the study’s instructions they were asked to read one of 
two hypothetical business scenarios (a modified version of the Keil et al. (2007) describing a 
troubled software development project for which they are responsible.  The content of each 
scenario was designed to experimentally manipulate the attribution factor being investigated.  In 
other words, attribution bias was not measured, but rather, study participants were assigned to 
                                                
4 The eight-minute response time criterion was selected because pilot test results indicated that this cutoff 
represented the best measure to ensure quality of data. In other words, more often than not, participants that took 
less than eight minutes to complete the survey appeared to have rushed through the questions and by doing so not 
pay full attention to the questions being asked, as indicated by their responses; e.g., answering all 4s (neutral) on a 
seven point scale, on a major portion of the questionnaire.  
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either an internal attribution or external attribution treatment condition.  In addition, since the 
overconfidence factor is treated as an individual trait, it was measured using Russo & 
Schoemaker’s (1992) confidence quiz.  Using a median split, subjects were classified as 
exhibiting either high or low overconfidence. 
After reading the business scenario, each participant was asked to decide either to re-
evaluate the product (which represents de-escalation) or continue with the product launch as 
planned (which represents escalation of commitment).  This measure of escalation of 
commitment also required participants to indicate how strong their decision is.  In addition, the 
questionnaire was designed to measure each participant’s level of overconfidence, capture 
demographic information and measure control variables: self-efficacy, temporariness of setback, 
age, and gender.  The two experimental treatment scenarios and the complete questionnaire are 
available in Appendix A and B (respectively).   
 
4.3 Measures 
In the current study we developed new measures in addition to using already tested and 
validated measures based on the literature.  However, when necessary existing measures were 
modified to accommodate the study.  
 
4.3.1 Control Variables 
 Personal responsibility and degree of project completion are factors that have been shown 
to have a positive effect on escalation of commitment.  Thus, these factors are controlled for 
through the design of our scenario.  Specifically, all study participants regardless of experimental 
treatment, will read a scenario in which they are explicitly told that they are personally 
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responsible for the project in question.  Further, all participants are informed that the project is 
complete at the time a decision (which accounts for any potential completion effect), about 
whether or not to continue with the product launch, is required.  
In addition, through questionnaire measurement items, we also controlled for: self-
efficacy, temporariness of setback, age, and gender.  These factors are discussed in turn. 
 
Self-Efficacy 
Self-efficacy “refers to beliefs in one’s capabilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive 
resources, and courses of action needed to meet situational demands” (Wood & Bandura, 1989, p 
408).  Prior research has shown strong support for the positive relationship between self-efficacy 
and escalation of commitment.  For instance, in a laboratory study where business students 
responded to decision dilemmas, Whyte et al. (1997) examined self-efficacy judgments as a 
potentially important individual factor that could result in escalation.  As predicted by self-
efficacy theory, the results indicate that self-percepts of high efficacy exacerbated the 
commitment of funds to a failing course of action whereas low efficacy diminished the effect.   
To measure self-efficacy we used Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) previously validated, 
ten-item scale. 
 
Temporariness of Setback 
Temporariness of setback refers to the perceived likelihood that the setback in question 
(e.g., lack of skill, ability, bad luck, task difficulty, as described by each experimental treatment 
condition) would persist over time.  This construct was added as a result of post pilot test 
interviews with study participants.  During the escalation decision of the pilot test, a couple of 
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the participants disclosed that they vacillated between whether or not to escalate their 
commitment as they pondered the temporariness of the setback.  Consequently, we decided to 
measure temporariness of setback to control for this possible confound on the criterion variable, 
escalation of commitment.  Thus, a two item-scale was developed using a 7-point scale (1= 
strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree: 
 I believe that the bugs that were identified are likely to persist over a long period of time 
(reverse coded).  
 I believe that the setback experienced on this project is temporary and easily overcome. 
 
Demographic Information 
 Previous research has shown there are risk-taking differences resulting from age and 
gender (Slovic, 1966; Vroom & Pahl, 1971).  Since escalation of commitment has been viewed 
as risk-taking behavior (Brockner, 1992; Whyte, 1986; Wong, 2005), our analysis will control 
for the age and gender of study participants.  
 
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
Two factors, i.e., attribution bias and overconfidence are examined for their potential 
effect on the criterion variable, i.e., escalation of commitment.  Attribution bias (external versus 
internal) is a manipulated variable via scenario design (a modification of Keil et al., 2007).  
Overconfidence is measured by obtaining the individuals metaknowledge score.  This procedure 
is facilitated by Russo & Schoemaker’s (1992) confidence quiz wherein participants are asked to 
provide an estimated lower and upper limit confidence interval to ten questions such that 
participants are 90 percent certain that the correct answer for each question will fall within the 
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limits provided.  By calculating the participant’s accuracy rate and comparing it with 90 percent, 
we obtain their metaknowledge score.  Using a median split, subjects are classified as exhibiting 
either high or low overconfidence.  Negative numbers that may result from this calculation, 
represent an individual that is under-confident.  
 
4.3.3 Mediating Variable – Desire to Rectify Past Outcomes 
Since desire to rectify past outcomes has not been operationalized in the literature, two 
new scale items were developed.  Specifically, participants are asked on a 7-point scale (1= 
strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree):  
 I feel that it is important for me to try and correct the bugs given how they came about.               
 I believe that correcting the bugs is the right thing to do, given the circumstances surrounding 
their cause.  
 
4.3.4 The Dependent Variable - Escalation of Commitment  
Typically, escalation of commitment is measured with items that ask survey participants 
the likelihood that they will continue investing resources into the project in question.  In the case 
of a product development launch, the context within which our scenario was designed, 
participants are typically asked to what extent are they likely to recommend continuing with the 
product launch (Biyalogorsky et al., 2006; Keil et al., 2007; Depledge, 2003).   
In the current research, the dependent variable, escalation of commitment, is measured 
with one scale item.  The one item is adopted directly from Keil et al. (2007); which asks 
respondents to indicate, on a 8-point scale (1= Re-evaluate: Definitely, 8= Continue as planned: 
Definitely), their decision regarding the product launch.  Specifically they are asked: 
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 Please indicate what you will recommend, and how strong that recommendation will be. 
  A higher rating or score, on the 8-point scale, would indicate a greater degree of escalation of 
commitment.   
 
4.3.5 Manipulation Check 
To ensure that participants were successfully manipulated by the two experimental 
treatments (internal versus external attribution), depending on the treatment condition, we 
assessed whether participants answered the manipulation check question (modified from 
Scapinello, 1988 and Libby & Rennekamp, 2011) correctly, relevant to the assigned 
experimental treatment.  On a 7-point scale, anchored by strongly disagree (1) and strongly 
agree (7), participants were asked:  
 I think the bugs discovered result from internal causes such as my own lack of skill in 
managing the product team and insufficient effort spent on the project. [Internal Attribution 
Experimental Treatment]  
 I think the bugs discovered result from external causes such as bad luck and the difficulty of 
the project itself.  (Reversed coded) [External Attribution Experimental Treatment] 
Two additional questions were used to ensure participants were manipulated by their 
respective treatment.  The two questions (modified from Staw and Ross, 1978) were designed to 
measure a subject’s perceived level of personal responsibility for the setback, as implied by the 
scenario:   
 I feel personally responsible for the bugs that were identified in this project.  
 I believe that I should be held responsible for the setback that occurred in this project.   
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Table 2: Summary of Measurement Instrument provides a summary of the measurement 
instrument and questionnaire outline. 
 
Question(s) Measurement Comments/Source 
Objective Style 
1 Escalation Decision 8-point Likert Previously validated 
scale (Keil et al., 2007) 
2 Escalation Decision Freeform narration Supplementary 
explanation of most 
important factor 
influencing escalation 
decision (Depledge, 
2003) 
3-4 Attribution 
(Manipulation check) 
7-point Likert Modified scale 
(Scapinello, 1988) and 
Libby & Rennekamp, 
2011) 
5-6 Personal 
Responsibility for 
Setback 
(Manipulation check) 
7-point Likert Modified scale (Staw & 
Ross, 1978) 
7-8 Temporariness of 
Setback 
7-point Likert New scale 
9-10 Desire to Rectify Past 
Outcomes 
7-point Likert New scale 
11-20 Self-Efficacy 7-point Likert Previously validated 
scale (Schwarzer & 
Jerusalem, 1995) 
 
21-30 Overconfidence  Confidence quiz  Previously validated 
(Libby & Rennekamp, 
2011)  
31-35 Demographics Selection from 
predefined list 
 
Table 2: Summary of the Measurement Instrument and Questionnaire Outline 
 
4.4 Data Analysis 
The data was analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistic 20 software.  The unit of analysis is the 
individual decision-maker, as we are examining the individual’s decision to either re-evaluate the 
product prior to deciding to launch or to launch as planned. 
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4.4.1 Data Exploration 
In accordance with Field (2013), the first step was to examine the data for normality and 
possible outliers.  Given that our data constitutes a large sample size, greater than 100 cases, the 
Central Limit Theorem5 serves as a good indication that our data is normally distributed (Field, 
2013).  Since our predictor variable overconfidence was measured and not manipulated, and is 
subject to outliers if a very small number of participants answer a large number of questions 
correctly, to test for outliers a boxplot analysis was conducted on the variable that feeds into 
establishing overconfidence level, i.e., the total number of correct answers on the confidence 
quiz (CQ); which is identified in the data-set as “total correct”.  The median correct on the CQ 
was two.  According to the boxplot and descriptives of this analysis (see Figure 2: Total Correct 
Boxplot Showing Extreme Cases), a total of six cases were identified as “extreme cases”; which 
constituted cases wherein the variable total correct was >= 7.  Five cases had a total correct 
equal to 7 and one case had a total correct of 8.  These six cases were omitted from further 
analysis, which resulted in a total sample size of N= 154.  Of the 154 participants, 79 remained 
in the external attribution condition while 75 remained in the internal attribution condition.   
                                                
5 The Central Limit Theorem specifies that there are a number of situations in which we can assume normality 
regardless of the shape of our data.  One such situation is when the sample size exceeds 100 cases (Field, 2013).   
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Figure 2: Total Correct Boxplot Showing Extreme Cases 
 
 
 
The mean score for the manipulation check question (which measured the extent to which 
a participant felt that the setback encountered in the failing project was due to internal causes) of 
the participants who read the internal attribution scenario was M= 5.60, whereas the mean score 
for the participants who read the external attribution scenario was M= 2.22.  A one-way ANOVA 
showed that the means are significantly different (F= 1025.39, p= .000) indicating that the 
scenarios manipulated the participants as intended.  A second measure, personal responsibility 
for the setback, was also used to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation.  Similarly, the 
mean scores for this measure showed that participants assigned to the their respective scenario 
(internal: M= 5.44 and external: M= 4.37, respectively) were manipulated as intended.  A one-
way ANOVA showed that the means were significantly different (F= 23.70, p= .000).  
 
  
 53 
4.5 Evaluation of the Constructs 
 There are three constructs obtained from the literature and used in this research, i.e., Self-
Efficacy, Desire to Rectify Past Outcomes, and Temporariness of Setback.  These factors, which 
together comprised 14 items, were evaluated together in one principal components factor 
analysis with orthogonal rotation (Varimax).  The Keiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the 
sampling adequacy, KMO = .828 (‘meritorious’ according to Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999), 
and all KMO values for individual items were greater than or equal to the acceptable minimum 
value of .5 (Field, 2013).  As can be seen in Table 4: Factor Analysis with All Constructs (after 
rotation) in Appendix C: Construct Evaluation, the constructs DRPO and Temporariness of 
Setback loaded as intended.  The measures for these two constructs loaded separately from each 
other showing good discrimination.  The measures for the Self-Efficacy (se) construct however, 
loaded on two factors, as discussed in more detail below.  Each construct’s factor analysis and 
scale reliability analysis (Cronbach’s α) are discussed in turn.  As a reference point, a Cronbach’s 
α greater than .7, denotes that the scale being measured is reliable (Nunnally, 1978).  
     
4.5.1 Self-Efficacy 
 The construct of self-efficacy is a previously validated scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 
1995) comprised of 10 reflective items.  The measures are shown in Appendix B: Questionnaire 
(items 11 to 20).  The factor analysis is shown in Table 5: Self-Efficacy Factor Analysis – 
Appendix C: Construct Evaluation.  As previously mentioned, since not all ten items loaded onto 
one factor, we decided to specify how many factors we wanted to extract (i.e., 1) and ran the 
analysis again.  When this was done, all ten items loaded into one factor with a Cronbach’s α 
.886.  However, measure se2 loaded below the acceptable threshold (i.e., .372) and Cronbach’s 
  
 54 
Alpha if Item Deleted indicated an alpha of .905, which is well above the overall α of .886; 
suggesting that the item should be considered for deletion.  Thus, a decision was made to remove 
the se2 measure from further analysis.  Table 6: Self-Efficacy Factor Analysis2, shows the 
remaining self-efficacy measures load onto one factor with a Cronbach’s α of .905. 
 
4.5.2 Desire to Rectify Past Outcomes (DRPO) 
As previously stated, the DRPO construct is a newly developed construct based on self-
justification theory assumptions.  It is intended to be composed of two reflective measures.  The 
measures are shown in Appendix B: Questionnaire (items 9 and 10).  The factor analysis is 
shown in Table 6: DRPO Factor Analysis in Appendix C: Construct Evaluation.  The two 
measures load onto one factor with a Cronbach’s α of .827. 
 
4.5.3 Temporariness of Setback 
The Temporariness of Setback is a newly developed construct composed of two reflective 
measures.  The measures are shown in Appendix B: Questionnaire (items 7 and 8). The first item 
is depicted as ts1_r, indicating that this measure is reverse-coded.  The factor analysis is shown is 
Table 8: Temporariness of Setback Factor Analysis in Appendix C: Construct Evaluation.  The 
two measures load onto one factor with a Cronbach’s α = .496.  Since the reliability for this scale 
is well below the acceptable threshold, it was decided to delete one of the measures (i.e., ts1_r) 
from further analysis, as we felt that the remaining item (ts2) more accurately reflects the 
construct we are trying to measure.   
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After remediation, Table 9: Factor Analysis with all Constructs (2) in Appendix C: 
Construct Evaluation, shows the final loadings of the items that remain and the explained 
variance for the same.  
 
4.6 Evaluation of the Model 
 The data were imported into IBM SPSS version 20.  There were two major components 
to data analysis: analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) and mediation analysis.  ANCOVA allowed 
us to examine the main effect hypotheses (H1 and H2), and to test for a possible interaction 
effect between the attribution and overconfidence factors.  Mediation analysis was facilitated by 
the MEDIATE macro (Hayes & Preacher, 2012), which allows us to examine the hypothesized 
mediation effects of the DRPO construct.  This approach to mediation analysis was selected 
because it allows the testing of mediation models that include multiple predictors and uses a 
bootstrapping approach to estimate indirect effects.  Mediation is tested, by assessing the values 
within the confidence interval.  If the confidence interval contains zero, then we cannot conclude 
that mediation has occurred.  If the confidence interval doesn’t contain zero, then we can 
conclude that mediation has occurred (Field, 2013, p. 419).  Both models were calculated at a 
90% confidence interval.  
In an attempt to reduce within-group error variance we analyzed the data using 
ANCOVA (Analysis of Covariance).  This technique allows for the inclusion of covariates we 
believe may explain some of the variance error.  But before proceeding with this technique, we 
must ensure that the effect of a given covariate is independent from the experimental treatment.  
The reason this assumption must be met prior to conducting the ANCOVA is because when 
experimental treatments differ on a given covariate, incorporating the covariate into the analysis 
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will not control for or balance out the difference, instead it biases our interpretation of the results 
(Field, 2013).  A simple ANOVA was used to test this assumption.  The results of the ANOVA 
on our two-predictor variables (attribution and overconfidence level) showed that the effect of 
our four covariates (self-efficacy, temporariness of setback, age, and gender), are independent 
from each combination of our experimental treatments.  Thus, we proceeded to run the 
ANCOVA.   
 
4.6.1  ANCOVA Results  
 The ANCOVA was designed to examine the main effects of attribution (internal versus 
external) and overconfidence (high versus low) on escalation decision (while controlling for 
temporariness of setback, self-efficacy, gender, and age) and to test for a possible interaction 
effect.  For the criterion variable, escalation of commitment, Table 3 shows the resulting number 
of subjects (N) for each cell, the corresponding mean score, and standard deviation (in 
parenthesis).  
 
 High 
Overconfidence 
Low 
Overconfidence 
Internal 
Attribution 
N = 44 
M = 5.39 (2.07) 
N = 27 
M = 4.07 (2.27) 
External 
Attribution 
N = 45 
M = 5.71 (2.03) 
N = 32 
M = 5.09 (2.36)  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
There was a significant main effect of attribution on escalation decision at the .1 level, F 
(1, 140) = 2.543, p = .056.  However, the observed relationship was in the opposite direction as 
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hypothesized.  There was a significant main effect of overconfidence level on escalation, F (1, 
140) = 7.27, p = .004 in the hypothesized direction.  There was no significant interaction effect 
between attribution and overconfidence level on escalation decision, F (1, 140) = 1.005, ns.  The 
covariates, temporariness of setback and gender were not found to be significant, F (1, 140) = 
1.51, p = .222, and F (1, 140) = .571, p = .451 (respectively).  The covariate, self-efficacy, had a 
significant effect on escalation decision at the .1 level, F (1, 140) = 2.83, p = .095.  The 
covariate, age, was significantly related to escalation decision, F (1, 140) = 6.51, p = .012.  These 
effects are depicted in Figure 3: ANCOVA Results. 
         
Figure 3: ANCOVA Results 
                
 
The overall explanatory power of the model is represented by the R2 value.  The overall 
explanatory power of the ANCOVA indicates that the adjusted R2 = .10, indicating that the 
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model accounts for approximately 10% of the variance in escalation decision.  The relative effect 
of attribution and overconfidence level is assessed using the f2 effect size.  This measure tells us 
how much a predictor variable has affected the dependent variable.  Cohen (1988) provides the 
following guideline to interpret the values of f2: 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 are termed small, medium, 
and large, respectively.  In our model, both predictor variables have a small effect size wherein 
f2 = .02 for attribution and f2 = .03 for overconfidence.   
 
4.6.2 Mediation Analysis Results 
 Mediation analysis was performed to examine whether DRPO mediates the effects of 
attribution and overconfidence on escalation.  Again, the CI of the indirect effect determines the 
significance of the mediation effect.  Thus, if the confidence interval doesn’t contain zero, then 
we can conclude that mediation has occurred (Field, 2013, p. 419).  There was a significant 
indirect effect of attribution on escalation through DRPO, b = －.1101, BCa CI (Bias-Corrected 
and Accelerated (BCa) Confidence Intervals (CIs) [－.271, －.014].  Note that the confidence 
interval for the indirect effect is a BCa boostrapped CI based on 1000 samples.  To assess 
whether DRPO partially or fully mediates the relationship between attribution and escalation 
decision, Baron & Kenny (1986) provide the following guideline.  Complete mediation between 
X and Y is supported if the effect of X, when controlling for M is zero or not significant.  Partial 
mediation occurs when the effect of X is merely reduced, but not eliminated (Barry & Kenny, 
1986).  Thus, we can compare the p-value for the regression results when the mediator variable 
DRPO is not included in the model versus when it is.  In our model, the results indicate that 
when DRPO is not included in the model, attribution is significant at the .1 level (p = .07).  
However, when DRPO is included in the model, attribution is no longer significant (p = .135); 
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indicating that DRPO fully mediates the effect between attribution and escalation decision.  
There was no significant indirect effect of overconfidence level on escalation decision through 
DRPO, b = .031, BCa CI [－.089, .173].  Figure 4: Mediation Model, illustrates attribution as a 
predictor of escalation decision mediated by DRPO, whereas overconfidence is not mediated by 
DRPO. 
Figure 4: Mediation Model 
 
 
4.7 Evaluation of the Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis stated: 
H1: Individuals who attribute the causes of a project’s setback to internal factors will 
be more likely to escalate their commitment than individuals who attribute the 
causes of the setback to external factors. 
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This hypothesis was not supported.  What is interesting is that the results indicate the opposite 
effect, wherein attributing the causes of a setback to external causes, tends to lead to escalation 
of commitment to a greater extent than attributing a setback internally.  This reversed effect 
however, was significant at the .1 level.  
The second hypothesis stated: 
H2:  Individuals who are more overconfident will escalate their commitment to a 
greater extent than individuals who are less overconfident.   
This hypothesis was supported, indicating that individuals who exhibit a high level of 
overconfidence have a greater tendency to escalate their commitment to a failing course of 
action, than individuals who exhibit a low level of overconfidence.   
 The third hypothesis stated: 
 H3: Desire to rectify past outcomes will mediate the effect of attribution on escalation. 
 
This hypothesis was supported.  There was a significant indirect effect of attribution on 
escalation decision through DRPO at a 90% confidence interval.   
 Lastly, hypothesis four stated: 
H4: Desire to rectify past outcomes will mediate the effect of overconfidence on 
escalation. 
This hypothesis was not supported.  
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4.7.1 Modified Research Model 
 The modified research model is depicted in figure 5: Modified Research Model 
 
Figure 5: Modified Research Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*1 p < .1 in the opposite direction as hypothesized, *p < .1, **p < .05 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, STUDY LIMITATIONS/DIRECCTION 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH, AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
5.1 Discussion and Conclusions 
Two of the four hypotheses tested were supported in this research.  The pattern of results 
obtained in testing H1  (attribution on escalation) was unexpected.  We had hypothesized that 
participants who attribute the cause of the setback to internal factors would escalate to a greater 
extent than participants in the external condition.  However, the opposite effect was observed.  
Though the effect was significant, it is a particularly interesting finding, as it runs counter to the 
prediction we made based on self-justification theory.  Thus, our results for H1 may serve as an 
impetus that challenges the self-justification theory notion of escalation of commitment. 
One possible explanation for the observed effect could be due to the manner in which we 
constructed our scenario.  For example, in our scenario we informed participants that they had 
two options, to either re-evaluate the project (which would indicate de-escalation) or to continue 
with the product launch as planned (which would indicate escalation).  However, our re-evaluate 
option also informed participants that they would have four months to assess the problem and 
then at that time make a decision to either launch the product or not.  Providing subjects with this 
kind of time window could have prompted them to choose to re-evaluate because by doing so 
they would have the opportunity to redeem their self-image.  After all, the internal causes 
specified in the scenario informed participants that the setback was due to insufficient effort 
spent on the project or their lack of ability managing the project team.  Thus, participants could 
have viewed this time window as an opportunity to make-up for the insufficient time spent on the 
project and or to acquire the skills necessary to manage the project better moving forward.  
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However, a closer examination of our results, which provided participants with the opportunity 
to explain their escalation decision, did not provide any evidence that this might be the case.  In 
fact, any mention of a time element, among participants in both treatments, had to do with the 
presence of the competition potentially launching their own product in the near future or that the 
time to re-evaluate was too long.  Thus, the time element caused participants to escalate more so 
than not in both treatments, not to de-escalate.  For example to the first point, one participant in 
the internal treatment who had escalated, provided the following information as to the primary 
reason s/he chose to continue with the product launch as planned, “Time is important, and bear in 
mind that competition is moving.”  To the second point, another participant who escalated 
commented, “The amount of time to reevaluate.”  In the external treatment any mention of time 
had a similar effect.  For instance, one participant commented, “Time to market and beating 
competitors.”  Again, these comments were common among participants in both treatments, 
suggesting that the time factor probably doesn’t explain the difference in escalation decision 
between the two experimental treatments. 
The results of our second hypothesis were not surprising, as H2 was supported.  H2 stated 
that highly overconfident individuals would escalate to a greater extent than those less 
overconfident, and in fact, this was the observed result.  Thus, the results confirm that 
individuals who are more overconfident are more likely to escalate their commitment.  Though 
the observed effect size was small (f2 = .03), the interpretation of this effect should be taken with 
caution, as the observed power (.764), to detect an effect, did not reach the .80 level we 
expected; which suggests that a larger sample size could have increased the observed power and 
consequently produce a greater effect size.  This limitation is discussed in more detail in our final 
chapter.  Nonetheless, the observed result is an important finding, as it confirms theoretical 
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predictions relevant to overconfidence and does suggest that more overconfident decision-
makers will be more prone to escalation. 
Our third hypothesis (H3) predicted that the effect of attribution on escalation would be 
mediated by DRPO.  This hypothesis was supported at the 90% confidence interval, indicating 
that a participant’s proclivity to escalate can be explained by their desire to rectify past 
outcomes.  This is another important finding as it provides evidence for one of the assumptions 
made by self-justification theory, which hasn’t been tested in the literature up to now.  
Our fourth and final hypothesis (H4) predicted that overconfidence level and its effect on 
escalation decision would be mediated by DRPO.  Surprisingly, this hypothesis was not 
supported.  This was an unexpected result as the literature clearly informs us, for one, that highly 
overconfident individuals have a strong desire to boost their ego and social status.  Since 
overconfident individuals have a tendency to believe that they are highly competent (Anderson, 
et al., 2012), one would expect that in the face of negative feedback overconfident individuals 
would be motivated to rectify past outcomes.  One would expect that they would be more willing 
to escalate in an effort to justify their competence, to boost their ego, and/or to save face.  One 
possible reason why self-justification theory assumptions were not supported for the mediating 
role of DRPO on the relationship between overconfidence and escalation is that overconfident 
individuals simply ignore negative feedback, and thus, have no desire to rectify a past mistake.  
Another explanation could be due to the existence of another theory or theories that may provide 
a better explanation for a different mechanism, other than DRPO, that serves as a more accurate 
explanation for the relationship between overconfidence and escalation.  This possibility may 
also explain why the relationship between attribution and escalation decision was the opposite of 
that which was expected.  To conclude, our study findings suggest that cognitive biases are 
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indeed a complex phenomenon to understand.  Thus, our limited understanding of how such 
biases affect decision-making, particularly within the context of escalation situations, warrants 
further research as discussed in more detail in the next section.   
  
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
As with most research this study has its limitations. First, this study only explores the 
effect of two cognitive biases on escalation of commitment.  Thus, future research could focus 
on examining the effect of other cognitive biases, as outlined by Hogarth (1986) and Sage (1981) 
that might also affect on escalation of commitment.  
A second limitation has to do with the observed power during the test of between-
subjects effects.  None of the variables tested (whether it be an independent variable or a 
covariate) generated an observed power of .80; which consequently, makes interpreting study 
findings very challenging.  For example, attribution had an observed power of .354.  This is well 
below the intended .80, and thus, could help explain why this factor was only marginally 
significant.  Overconfidence had an observed power of .764, which was much better but still 
slightly below our target threshold.  The observed power may be a result of the disparity between 
cell sizes, as observed in Table 3: Descriptive Statistics.  For example, the cell size for low 
overconfidence (internal treatment) is much smaller than for the high overconfidence (internal 
treatment; respectively, N = 27 versus N = 44.  Similarly, the cell size for the external treatment 
was 32 versus 45.  The discrepancy in cell sizes is due to the fact that people naturally tend to 
exhibit overconfidence.   
Clearly, a larger sample size and higher power is needed in order to more confidently test 
the relationships proposed in our research model.  Thus, future research should incorporate a 
  
 66 
greater sample size; which should take into consideration that, according to our results, and 
consistent with theory (e.g., see Merkle & Weber, 2011), high overconfidence among individuals 
is common among decision-makers.  Thus, a challenge to overcome during future data collection 
is that for every three individuals, two will be categorized as having high overconfidence.  
A third limitation is that this study only examines one facet of overconfidence, i.e., 
miscalibration, when in fact there exist two other facets (i.e., overestimation and better-than-
average effect).  Thus, further research is needed in order to examine whether the other two 
facets of overconfidence impact escalation decisions.   
Another limitation related to overconfidence is the issue of whether overconfidence is 
best conceived of as a specific individual trait, or whether it is something that is best conceived 
of as being context specific.  The literature on this point is mixed.  In this study, we treated 
overconfidence as an individual trait and thus our study findings may not be generalizable to the 
measurement of overconfidence as a context specific factor.  Thus, future research can explore 
this latter line of reasoning and how context specific overconfidence could lead to escalation of 
commitment.  
The last limitation is related to the scenario’s design.  For example, in our scenario 
attribution explanations contain both stable and transient elements; which can make it 
challenging for subjects to respond to the manipulation.  This may also explain why so many 
subjects failed the manipulation check.  In the internal attribution treatment the two attributions 
identified as being the main cause for the setback were lack of skill and lack of effort in 
managing the project team.  By combining these two attributional causes, the participant may 
have found it difficult to make an assessment if s/he believes that one cause relates to a 
temporary setback and one cause relates to a setback that cannot be easily overcome.  Further 
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research is needed in order to separate the two elements and explore them independently.  In this 
study, we deal with this situation by controlling for temporariness of the setback.  The fact that 
the temporariness of setback did not appear to have a significant effect on the escalation decision 
suggests that our findings can still be meaningfully interpreted. 
A post-hoc interview with a participant (assigned to the internal treatment) of the pilot 
study provided some clues for another potential reason why the failure rate for our manipulation 
check may have been high.  This participant suggested that even though the scenario indicated 
that internal factors were attributed to the cause of the setback, "...in reality, very rarely, could 
one attribute failure to only internal factors.  There are usually external factors that come into 
play as well.”  This participant’s response clearly indicates that not all individuals will be biased 
during decision making; that indeed, some individuals will consider both external and internal 
factors when making attributions, and thus, when making decisions.  Thus, future research may 
consider rewording the scenario in a manner that, in the participant’s words, “the cause of the 
setback is irrefutable.”  
Lastly, future research could develop and implement recommendations designed to 
reduce the effect of overconfidence and/or attribution bias on escalation.  For example, managers 
could be educated on overconfidence and/or attribution bias and then the researcher could 
measure whether or not education (or whatever intervention was employed) on biases results in a 
reduction on escalation of commitment. 
 
 
 
 
  
 68 
5.3 Contributions   
This dissertation contributes to both research and practice.  
 
5.3.1 Contributions to Research 
First, we explore the role of attribution and overconfidence as potential explanations for 
escalation of commitment behavior.  Second, we demonstrate and provide empirical evidence 
that substantiates the claim that attribution (though marginally so) and overconfidence, are 
cognitive biases that affect decision-making, specifically, in IT escalation situations.  
Another implication for research is that having a better understanding of what factors 
cause escalation of commitment has the potential of facilitating the development of reliable 
future research models.  In other words, when developing research models, researchers can use 
studies such as this to serve as a guide in developing models that either control for, or further 
examine attributional and overconfidence biases.  
Another contribution to research is the operationalization of one of the assumptions made 
by self-justification theory, namely that individuals have an innate desire to rectify negative past 
outcomes which have resulted as a consequence of the decision-maker’s own failings (Staw, 
1976).  Thus, our research substantiates the mediating role of desire to rectify past outcomes and 
is the first to provide empirical evidence for this underlying assumption of self-justification 
theory.  
 
5.3.2 Contributions to Practice 
From an Engaged Scholarship perspective, this research contributes to practice, as it 
addresses a real world problem that is of concern to practitioners.  This research falls within the 
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category of informed basic research; which is typically undertaken to “describe, explain, or 
predict a social phenomenon” (Van de Ven, 2007, p. 27).  And although direct contact was not 
established between the primary research team and potential study stakeholders (e.g., IT 
managers, IT business leaders, and IT software consumers), this study’s design was developed in 
such a way that study participant feedback was solicited in an effort to garner a better 
understanding of why escalation in IT projects occurs.  For example, one of the questions on the 
survey instrument asked study participants to explain what was the most influential factor why 
they decided to launch the product as planned or re-evaluate.  
In addition, an important benefit to practitioners is that having a better understanding of 
which cognitive biases lead to escalation of commitment could help managers develop processes 
and put controls in place to help minimize the effect of cognitive biases in escalation situations.  
For example, from our study results, we observed that overconfidence has a greater effect on 
escalation of commitment than attribution bias.  However, these results may be due to either a 
weak manipulation of attribution, or because in reality overconfidence simply has a greater effect 
on escalation of commitment than attribution bias.  To the latter point, it was clear that 
individuals with high overconfidence have a greater tendency to escalate their commitment to a 
failing course of action.  Thus, managers can use this information to perform their own due 
diligence, and make use of an employee’s recommendation, to either continue with a troubled 
project or not, accordingly.  However, to make use of our study findings, managers would need 
to know which of their employees are highly overconfident and staff projects accordingly.  To 
facilitate the process of understanding an employees’ proneness to biases, managers can test 
employees with tools such as the confidence quiz.  Though this may be an expensive proposition, 
it may prove to be cost effective in the long-term, as escalation of IT projects has proven to be a 
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costly mistake for many organizations.  Another suggestion would be to put processes in place to 
ensure, for example, that not only one person is responsible for making launch or no launch 
decisions, which may minimize the chances of project escalation due to an overly confident 
manager making important decisions.   
In summary, our study findings could help serve as a foundation for developing new 
research models, and could also help practitioners develop strategies (e.g., via training, 
education, etc.) that can serve to help organizations mitigate escalation behavior.  At a minimum, 
this study can serve to educate business leaders of the real world existence of cognitive biases 
and how these biases can adversely affect business decision-making.   
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APPENDIX A: INTERNAL ATTRIBUTION AND EXTERNAL ATTRIBUTION 
SCENARIOS 
  
Internal Attribution Scenario – Experimental Treatment 1: 
ComSoft is an industry leading information systems (IS) vendor. You are ComSoft’s Manager for SoftBiz, a product 
that is being developed based on a proposal that you had made to ComSoft’s Executive Committee. Everyone knows 
that this project is your baby. Because SoftBiz is so revolutionary, the project has always faced both technical and 
market uncertainty. Nevertheless, potential customers have expressed delight with the product concept and are 
expecting it to be launched within the next month.  However, Comsoft is racing against time as other competitors are 
planning to launch similar products.   
All of the development work on SoftBiz has been completed and the company has publicly announced that the 
product will ship within the next two weeks. However, a recent development has occurred that has focused 
everyone’s attention on the timing of SoftBiz’s release. Specifically, the SoftBiz testing team has just identified 
some bugs with the system kernel that affect the protocols used for object messaging. You attribute the bugs 
discovered to internal causes such as your own lack of skill in managing the product team and insufficient effort 
spent on the project. 
Within the hour, you must meet with ComSoft’s Executive Committee to recommend whether or not to proceed 
with launching SoftBiz as scheduled. Based on your review of the project’s status, you have identified two possible 
courses of action. The first course of action is to launch SoftBiz as previously scheduled without correcting the 
recently discovered bugs. In the software industry, this course of action is not uncommon as companies routinely 
release products before they are fully debugged, since many bugs can be corrected with service packs that are issued 
to customers at a later date.  The second course of action is to delay the product launch, initiate a four-month 
investigation into the extent and nature of the bugs and what it may take to correct them, and then re-evaluate the 
feasibility of launching the product at that time. Recommending this course of action will mean that ComSoft risks 
being beaten to market by one or more competitors. You must decide which one of these two courses of action to 
recommend to ComSoft’s Executive Committee. 
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External Attribution Scenario – Experimental Treatment 2: 
ComSoft is an industry leading information systems (IS) vendor. You are ComSoft’s Manager for SoftBiz, a product 
that is being developed based on a proposal that you had made to ComSoft’s Executive Committee. Everyone knows 
that this project is your baby. Because SoftBiz is so revolutionary, the project has always faced both technical and 
market uncertainty. Nevertheless, potential customers have expressed delight with the product concept and are 
expecting it to be launched within the next month.  However, Comsoft is racing against time as other competitors are 
planning to launch similar products.   
All of the development work on SoftBiz has been completed and the company has publicly announced that the 
product will ship within the next two weeks. However, a recent development has occurred that has focused 
everyone’s attention on the timing of SoftBiz’s release. Specifically, the SoftBiz testing team has just identified 
some bugs with the system kernel that affect the protocols used for object messaging. You attribute the bugs 
discovered to external causes such as bad luck and the inherent difficulty of the project itself. 
Within the hour, you must meet with ComSoft’s Executive Committee to recommend whether or not to proceed 
with launching SoftBiz as scheduled. Based on your review of the project’s status, you have identified two possible 
courses of action. The first course of action is to launch SoftBiz as previously scheduled without correcting the 
recently discovered bugs. In the software industry, this course of action is not uncommon as companies routinely 
release products before they are fully debugged, since many bugs can be corrected with service packs that are issued 
to customers at a later date.  The second course of action is to delay the product launch, initiate a four-month 
investigation into the extent and nature of the bugs and what it may take to correct them, and then re-evaluate the 
feasibility of launching the product at that time. Recommending this course of action will mean that ComSoft risks 
being beaten to market by one or more competitors. You must decide which one of these two courses of action to 
recommend to ComSoft’s Executive Committee. 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
  
 88 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 89 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 90 
 
 
 
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
NOTE: 
Questions 21-30 (the Confidence Quiz designed to measure overconfidence), according to Libby 
& Rennekamp (2011, p. 227):  
 
Allow us to capture a relatively stable measure of individual miscalibration. Since the 
task asks managers to provide 90% confidence intervals for each question, well-
calibrated individuals should provide only one interval (out of 10) that does not include 
the true answer to the question. As overconfidence increases, individuals provide more 
intervals that are too narrow (i.e., do not include the true answer). 
 
Actual answers for the quiz items:  
21) 250,000 lbs. 
22) 1513 
23) 191 
24) 206 bones 
25) 8,300,000 
26) 10,543 
27) 18,000,000 
28) 4,000 miles 
29) 1,044 miles per hour 
30) 9,500,000 
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APPENDIX C: EVALUATION OF CONSTRUCTS 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 
se9 .908    
se7 .843    
se10 .823    
se8 .814    
se5 .795 .321   
se4 .637 .485   
se1  .785   
se2  .721   
se3 .382 .655   
se6 .412 .598   
drpo1   .923  
drpo2   .895  
ts1_r    .864 
ts2    .709 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
Table 4: Factor Analysis with all Constructs 
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Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
se10 .859 
se5 .851 
se9 .844 
se4 .829 
se7 .815 
se8 .740 
se6 .724 
se3 .682 
se1 .615 
se2 .374 
Cronbach’s α .886 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. a. 1 component extracted. 
Table 5: Self-Efficacy Factor Analysis 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
se10 .854 
se5 .848 
se9 .843 
se4 .816 
se7 .806 
se8 .729 
se6 .696 
se3 .648 
se1 .607 
Cronbach’s α .905 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 1 component extracted. 
Table 6: Self-Efficacy Factor Analysis2 
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Table 7: DRPO Factor Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Temporariness of Setback Factor Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	   	  
Component	  Matrixa	  
 Component 
1 
drpo2 .923 
drpo1 .923 
Cronbach’s α .827 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.                  
a.1 components extracted  
Component	  Matrixa	  
 Component 
1 
ts2 .823 
ts1_r .823 
Cronbach’s α .496 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.                    
a. 1 components extracted.	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Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 
se10 .853  
se5 .851  
se9 .846  
se7 .816  
se4 .807  
se8 .727  
se6 .682  
se3 .642  
se1 .597  
drpo1  .935 
drpo2  .907 
%Total rotated variance 
explained 
47.88 16.02 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. a. 
Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
Table 9: Factor Analysis with all Constructs (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
